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ABSTRACT
Objective To assess the impact of a pay for performance
incentive on quality of care and outcomes among UK
patients with hypertension in primary care.
Design Interrupted time series.
Setting The Health Improvement Network (THIN)
database, United Kingdom.
Participants 470725 patients with hypertension
diagnosed between January 2000 and August 2007.
Intervention The UK pay for performance incentive (the
Quality and Outcomes Framework), which was
implemented in April 2004 and included specific targets
for general practitioners to show high quality care for
patients with hypertension (and other diseases).
Main outcomemeasures Centiles of systolic and diastolic
blood pressures over time, rates of blood pressure
monitoring, blood pressure control, and treatment
intensity at monthly intervals for baseline (48 months)
and 36 months after the implementation of pay for
performance. Cumulative incidence of major
hypertension related outcomes and all causemortality for
subgroups of newly treated (treatment started six months
before pay for performance) and treatment experienced
(started treatment in year before January 2001) patients
to examine different stages of illness.
Results After accounting for secular trends, no changes in
blood pressure monitoring (level change 0.85, 95%
confidence interval −3.04 to 4.74, P=0.669 and trend
change −0.01, −0.24 to 0.21, P=0.615), control (−1.19,
−2.06 to 1.09, P=0.109 and −0.01, −0.06 to 0.03,
P=0.569), or treatment intensity (0.67, −1.27 to 2.81,
P=0.412 and 0.02, −0.23 to 0.19, P=0.706) were
attributable to pay for performance. Pay for performance
had no effect on the cumulative incidence of stroke,
myocardial infarction, renal failure, heart failure, or all
cause mortality in both treatment experienced and newly
treated subgroups.
Conclusions Good quality of care for hypertension was
stable or improving before pay for performance was
introduced. Pay for performance had no discernible
effects on processes of care or on hypertension related
clinical outcomes. Generous financial incentives, as
designed in the UK pay for performance policy,may not be
sufficient to improve quality of care and outcomes for
hypertension and other common chronic conditions.
INTRODUCTION
Since 2000 the use of pay for performance policies that
link a portion of doctors’ payment to measures of
healthcare quality has increased rapidly. Both govern-
ments and private payers have promoted pay for per-
formance in the belief that economic incentives can
accelerate improvements in the quality and outcomes
of care. Surprisingly, there is little rigorous evidence to
support or refute use of these policies.1 Indeed, pay for
performance schemes may result in unintended out-
comes as a result of adverse selection, such as the exclu-
sion of severely ill patients from care.2-4
The impacts of pay forperformanceon thequality and
outcomes of care for common chronic conditions such
as hypertension are largely unknown. The prevalence of
hypertension among those over age 50 is about 50%;
hypertension is among the most treatable, but under-
treated, of cardiovascular risk factors.5 Studies indicate
consistently that one third of people with a known
diagnosis of hypertension are either untreated or
uncontrolled.67 Better control of hypertension on a
population-wide basis could yield substantial reductions
in morbidity and premature mortality,68 and this also
makes it an attractive target for pay for performance.
We studied a large scale pay for performance policy
in the four countries of the United Kingdom (England,
Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland), which tar-
geted several chronic diseases in primary care, and
evaluated its impact on themanagement and outcomes
of hypertension. Based on the proportion of patients
achieving certain quality indicators, general practi-
tioners could receive payments as high as 25% of
their total income.9 The programme started in April
2004 and included 136 quality indicators, including
five for hypertension (see web extra), one of which
was the proportion of patients with blood pressures
controlled to 150/90 mmHg or less.10
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This natural experiment was ideal for detecting the
effects of pay for performance on the care and outcomes
of hypertension. Although the programme was volun-
tary, 99.6% of general practitioners participated.11 The
financial incentives for doctors to achieve the quality
standards were substantial; theUKNationalHealth Ser-
vice committed £1.8bn (€2.1bn; $2.8bn) in funding.12
Almost simultaneously (June 2004) the National Insti-
tute for Health and Clinical excellence (NICE) released
guidelines for the detection and management of hyper-
tension, which were consistent with the pay for perfor-
mance intervention guidance and may have also
reinforced the intervention.13 Using data obtained from
representative primary care practices in the United
Kingdom, we evaluated whether the introduction of
pay for performance had an impact on quality of care
for hypertension and the risk of major adverse clinical
outcomes.
METHODS
Weused data fromTheHealth ImprovementNetwork
(THIN), a large database of primary care medical
records, with about 6.2 million patient years from
358 general practices in the United Kingdom.14 The
database contains validated sociodemographic records
of patients as well as the results of medical tests, diag-
noses, free text comments, and prescriptions written
during medical practice at the level of individual
patient visits. These data also include reports on epi-
sodes of secondary care (for example, hospital admis-
sions, emergency care) as well as information on
referral to specialists and some lifestyle characteristics
and measurements, such as smoking status and body
mass index. The data provide a longitudinal record of
care for each patient. The database is nationally repre-
sentative and has been used in several published stu-
dies of chronic conditions.14-17
Our study sample consisted of 470 725 patients with
a diagnosis of hypertension during the observation
period (January 2000 to July 2007). Similar to our pre-
vious studies on drug use and clinical outcomes, we
chose a common condition and a large sample to max-
imise precision and achieve stable estimates of study
outcomes.18-20 We used a previously validated algo-
rithm to define hypertension, using diagnostic Read
codes (clinical terms version 3, categories G20 and
662..) in the patient records.17 21 We defined diagnosis
as the presenceof at least twodiagnosticRead codes for
hypertension; treatment initiation was defined as the
date of the first prescription.We excluded 762 patients
of non-permanent registration status (such as tempor-
ary residents or visitors) or who had changed practice
before 1 January 2000.
Study design
FromTHINwe extracted data on visits to primary care
for seven years. We measured changes in processes of
care (frequency of treatment initiation andmonitoring,
intensity of prescribing), intermediate outcomes (cen-
tiles of blood pressure, rate of hypertension control),
and clinical outcomes (all cause mortality, incidence
of hypertension related adverse outcomes:myocardial
infarction, heart failure, stroke, and renal failure), three
years before, and up to four years after, the implemen-
tation of pay for performance.
Statistical analyses
Weused interrupted time series analysis, a strong long-
itudinal quasi-experimental design, to evaluate the
impact of the pay for performance initiative on the
management and outcomes of hypertension.22 Using
segmented linear regression models we examined the
frequency of bloodpressuremeasurement and the pro-
portion of patients with controlled blood pressure each
month, which were incentivised directly in the pay for
performance initiative for hypertension. In addition,
we examined changes in the rates of new treatment
for hypertension and intensity of prescribing (that is,
use of combination therapy), which were not incenti-
vised in pay for performance. We hypothesised that
these may have been affected indirectly as general
practitioners strove to meet the incentivised targets
for hypertension. Controlling for baseline level and
trend we used these models to estimate the changes in
levels and trends of rates after the implementation of
pay for performance.23 For each time series model we
included an extensive preintervention period to con-
trol for biases in level and trend at baseline.
We used segmented survival analysis to assess the
impact of the intervention on the cumulative incidence
and monthly proportions of hypertension related
outcomes.19 The hypertension prescribing guidelines
published by NICE in June 2004 were issued in the
same quarter as the roll-out of the pay for performance
Characteristics of overall study population and subgroups of newly treated and treatment
experienced patients. Values are numbers (percentages) unless stated otherwise
Characteristics
Overall study
population
(n=470 725)
Newly treated
subgroup*
(n=103 009)
Treatment experienced
subgroup†
(n=104 754)
Overall mean (SD) age 58.3 (15.4) 58.1 (15.6) 56.7 (15.3)
Mean (SD) age (years) by age group:
<55 184 524 (39.2) 41 018 (39.8) 45 546 (43.5)
55-64 116 739 (24.8) 25 033 (24.3) 24 445 (23.3)
65-74 102 618 (21.9) 21 628 (21.0) 21 856 (20.9)
≥75 66 372 (14.1) 15 330 (14.9) 12 907 (12.32)
Female 259 714 (55.2) 57 527 (55.9) 59 977 (57.3)
Mean (SD) body mass index 28.9 (5.2) 28.6 (5.7) 29.1 (5.6)
Diabetes 68 867 (16.6) 15 813 (15.4) 17 614 (16.8)
Myocardial infarction‡ 24 797 (5.27) 898 (0.87) 1896 (1.81)
Depression 112 752 (23.9) 23 532 (22.8) 25 335 (24.2)
Stroke 37 789 (8.0) 2313 (2.25) 4362 (4.16)
Smokers 146 561 (31.1) 34 227 (33.2) 34 339 (32.8)
Alcohol misuse 78 389 (16.7) 19 127 (18.6) 20 664 (19.7)
Heart failure 24 007 (5.1) 1154 (1.12) 2726 (2.6)
Renal failure 10 827 (2.3) 980 (0.95) 1690 (1.61)
Lowest socioeconomic status§ 53 157 (11.3) 11 297 (8.0) 11 336 (10.8)
*Cohort followed up for 45 months from October 2003 to July 2007.
†Cohort followed up for 80 months from January 2001 to July 2007.
‡Both cohorts do not add up to 100% because only newly treated patients in pre-intervention period are
included. Higher proportion of outcomes in treatment experienced cohort is due to longer follow-up.
§Socioeconomic status according to fifths of Townsend’s deprivation index.
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initiative, and the various indicatorswe examinedwere
consistent with these guidelines. To limit cointerven-
tion confounding of the time series we therefore
definedApril to June 2004 as the intervention phase-in
period.24 We evaluated each aggregated time series
model for confounding by seasonality.24
We used SAS software, version 9.1, for all analyses.
Our data consisted of continuous measurements of
variables at the population level, summarised at regu-
lar, evenly spaced time intervals,making them suitable
for interrupted time series analysis. Because we used
aggregated time series data at population level, our
analyseswere not affected by clusteringbias.24We con-
verted all time series of blood pressure control, fre-
quency of blood pressure measurements, number of
drug categories prescribed, and number of newly trea-
ted patients (treatment started six months before the
introduction of pay for performance) to rates by divid-
ing the total for each month by the number of patients
enrolled in the cohort for that month. To estimate
changes in these rates for all groups after the inter-
vention, we used segmented linear regression models
controlling for level and trend before the implementa-
tion of pay for performance.19 22 The basic model
included terms to estimate the pre-existing level for
each rate in the first month of the observation period
(intercept), trend in the rate before implementation of
pay for performance, change in level of the rate imme-
diately after implementation, and change in trend after
implementation.We corrected the models for the seri-
ally autocorrelated nature of the observations.24 To
identify the most parsimonious models we used back-
ward elimination.
We used Cox proportional hazards regressionmod-
els to obtain cumulative incidence rates of all cause
mortality, myocardial infarction, stroke, heart failure,
and renal failure for both newly treated and treatment
experienced cohorts, adjusting for age, sex, smoking
status, diabetes, depression, and body mass index at
entry into the study cohort.25 26 Specifically, we defined
the newly treated cohort as patients who started treat-
ment in the 12 months before October 2003 (six
months before pay for performance) and followed
them for up to 45 months until July 2007. The treat-
ment experienced cohort included patients who
started treatment in the 12 months before January
2001. We followed this cohort for up to 80 months
until July 2007. We ran the analyses using data from
patients with only complete information for all vari-
ables (78% of the total sample). To determine whether
the hazard ratios for each hypertension related out-
come differed before and after the implementation of
pay for performancewe fitted extended piecewise Cox
models25 in separatemodels for the two cohorts, which
allow for fixed and time dependent covariates and for
different hazard ratios in different time segments. We
censored patients at the date of the occurrence of the
first hypertension related outcome, date of death, date
of loss to follow-up (for example, relocation), or end of
study period.
Blood pressure measures
Blood pressure represents the principal dependent
variable for this study, as general practitioners were
incentivised directly to lower blood pressure to 150/
90 mmHg or less (see web extra).
We extracted records of blood pressure measure-
ments for all study patients. To assess the impact of
pay for performance on blood pressure control over
time, we calculated the proportion of patients with
blood pressure less than 150/90 mm Hg as a propor-
tion of all patients with ameasurement in each quarter.
We also calculated the median, 25th, and 75th centile
of the systolic and diastolic blood pressure for each
quarter of observation and used longitudinal displays
of the medians and centiles of systolic and diastolic
blood pressures for the 23 consecutive quarters of the
study. In addition to blood pressure values, we
assessed the impact of the intervention on blood pres-
sure monitoring itself by calculating the proportion of
patients each month with a blood pressure measure-
ment as a proportion of all study patients.
Intensity of treatment
We analysed the impact of pay for performance on
intensity of treatment, which we conceptualised as the
number of different antihypertensive drugs prescribed
per patient. The NICE guidelines call for serially add-
ing drugs to the therapeutic regimen of patients with
persistent uncontrolled blood pressure.27 We deter-
mined for each month the proportion of patients
receiving zero, one, two, and three or more classes of
antihypertensive drugs as a proportion of all study
patients. In addition, we created time series of newly
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Fig 1 | Time series of centiles of systolic and diastolic blood
pressure in United Kingdom by quarter from January 2001 to
July 2007
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treated patients each month as a proportion of all
patients.
Clinical outcomes
Wemeasured all cause mortality and incident cases of
several hypertension related clinical outcomes (myo-
cardial infarction, stroke, heart failure, and renal fail-
ure) based on previously validated Read codes.14 16 17 28
Specifically, we usedRead codes in the categoriesG30,
G34, andG35 formyocardial infarction; G61 andG64
to G68 for stroke; G23 and G58 for heart failure; and
G22, 1Z1, K05, and K06 for renal failure.
To examine the effect of pay for performance on
patients at different stages of hypertension, we carried
out stratifiedanalysesof the two subgroupsofnewly trea-
ted and treatment experienced patients to identify any
changes in the cumulative incidence rate of hyperten-
sion related clinical outcomes and all cause mortality.
RESULTS
The table shows the characteristics of the study popu-
lation (n=470 725). Just over 60% was aged 55 years or
older at the time hypertension was diagnosed. Distri-
butions of age, sex, smoking status, socioeconomic sta-
tus, diabetes, and depression were similar between the
newly treated and treatment experienced subgroups.
Blood pressure control
Figure 1 shows the median and centiles (5th, 25th,
75th, and 95th) of diastolic and systolic blood pressure
for the study population for 23 consecutive quarters
from January 2001 to July 2007. No clinically or statis-
tically significant changes were observed in any levels
or trends of these time series of blood pressure levels.
The proportion of patients with controlled blood
pressure at the start of observation was about 70%
(fig 2). This proportion showed a slight decreasing
trend during the period before pay for performance
at a rate of −0.04%permonth (95% confidence interval
−0.01 to −0.08, P=0.028), which continued after imple-
mentation of the initiative. After pay for performance
had been implemented, the rate of controlled blood
pressure did not change significantly for either level
(−1.19, 95% confidence interval −2.06 to 1.09,
P=0.109) or trend (−0.01, −0.06 to 0.03, P=0.569).
The time series of the percentage of patients with
blood pressure measured each month increased
slightly from about 45.6% at the start of observation
(before pay for performance) at a rate of 0.15% per
month (95% confidence interval 0.03 to 0.34,
P=0.021, fig 2). Changes in the frequency of blood
pressure measurement after implementation of the
pay for performance initiative did not differ signifi-
cantly (level change 0.85, 95% confidence interval
−3.04 to 4.74, P=0.669) and trend change −0.01, 95%
confidence interval −0.24 to 0.21, P=0.615).
Treatment intensity
During the 48 month baseline period a steady decline
occurred in the proportion of patients receiving no
drugs (baseline trend −0.02%, 95% confidence interval
−0.01 to −0.04, P=0.009) or only one drug (−0.22%,
−0.18 to −0.24, P<0.001; fig 3). A simultaneous
increase was observed in the proportion of patients
receiving combination therapy with either two drugs
(0.02%, 0.01 to 0.03, P<0.001) or three or more drugs
(0.19%, 0.18 to 0.21, P<0.001). Pay for performance
was not, however, associated with any changes in
these trends in drug prescribing.After the implementa-
tion of pay for performance, no change from baseline
occurred in the proportion of patients receiving one
drug (level change 0.07%, 95% confidence interval
−0.83 to 0.98, P=0.874 and trend change 0.03%, 95%
confidence interval −0.01 to 0.07, P=0.190), two drugs
(0.03%, −0.19 to 0.26, P=0.805 and −0.01%, −0.01 to
0.02, P=0.431), or three ormore drugs (0.11%,−0.26 to
0.47, P=0.559 and 0.02%, −0.15 to 0.18, P=0.142).
During the baseline 48 month period before the
implementation of pay for performance, 0.05% more
patients per month started drug treatment (95% confi-
dence interval 0.03 to 0.06, P<0.001; fig 3). After
implementation, the rate of new drug treatment was
continuous (level change 0.67, −1.27 to 2.81, P=0.412
and trend change 0.02, −0.23 to 0.19, P=0.706).
Major adverse medical outcomes
Figure 4 shows the cumulative incidence rates (with
95% confidence intervals) of patients experiencing
any adverse clinical outcome (myocardial infarction,
stroke, heart failure, or renal failure) or all cause mor-
tality for the subgroup of patients whose treatment
started before January 2001 (treatment experienced
patients) and whose treatment was started six months
before the implementation of pay for performance
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(newly treated patients). Both subgroups were fol-
lowed for 40 months after the implementation of pay
for performance. The cumulative incidence of these
clinical outcomes increased linearly, with tight confi-
dence intervals for both subgroups.
When age, sex, smoking status, diabetes, and body
mass index had been controlled for, no clinically or
statistically significant discontinuities were observed
in the cumulative incidence of experiencing a hyper-
tension related clinical outcome in both subgroups
after the start of pay for performance, or during the
36 months until the end of follow-up. Analysis of
each of the hypertension related outcomes individu-
ally yielded similar results (data not shown).
Figure 4 also shows a time series of the composite
end point of all cause mortality and adverse hyperten-
sion related outcomes during the entire study period.
These outcomes showed a steady increasing trend
before the intervention (baseline trend 0.04, 95% con-
fidence interval 0.02 to 0.06, P<0.001). The level and
trend for these adverse outcomes did not change sig-
nificantly after the start of pay for performance (level
change 0.07%, 95% confidence interval −0.13 to 0.28,
P=0.224 and trend change 0.05%, 95% confidence
interval −0.02 to 0.07, P=0.257).
DISCUSSION
Explicit financial incentives in the pay for performance
initiative introduced in the United Kingdom in April
2004 did not improve the quality of care and clinical
outcomes for patients with hypertension in primary
care.Using a quasi experimental study design,we eval-
uated the impact of the policy on the quality of care and
outcomes for hypertension in almost half a million
patients and their general practitioners in the United
Kingdom over seven years. Throughout the study per-
iod we observed steady improvements in themeasure-
ment of blood pressure and intensity of treatment. A
simple before and after analysis would have produced
spurious effects of pay for performanceowing to lack of
control for secular trends. Our study showed that the
implementation of pay for performance had neither an
immediately discernible (a level change) nor a sus-
tained (a trend change) effect on the rate of blood pres-
sure monitoring and control, despite these being
among the compensated pay for performance mea-
sures. Furthermore, we did not find any statistically
significant changes in the cumulative incidence of
major hypertension related adverse outcomes or mor-
tality after the implementation of pay for performance
for the subgroups of treatment experienced and newly
treated patients.
We found no evidence of gaming of the system to
achieve quality targets. The level and trend for newly
treated patients did not change after the implementa-
tion of pay for performance.We hypothesised that this
measure would change because of the ease of imple-
mentation for general practitioners. (Doctors could
have stepped up the treatment of patients with blood
pressure close to control, resulting in an increase in the
proportion of newly treated patients.) This lack of evi-
dence for gaming is consistent with other studies.29
Policy implications
These findings may have several explanations. Firstly,
given the observed improvements in quality of care
indicators for hypertension in the years before pay
for performance, such as more frequent monitoring
of blood pressure and increasingly more aggressive
treatment, doctors may have already been implement-
ing the appropriate changes in practice to achieve the
pay for performance standards. Although the financial
incentives in the policywere considerable, it is possible
that the pay for performance targets for hypertension
were set too low and therefore doctors did not need to
change behaviour significantly to attain them. A smal-
ler study of the United Kingdom’s pay for perfor-
mance initiative, which evaluated the impact of this
intervention on calculated clinical quality scores for
selected conditions (but not controlling for secular
trends), found that the policy led to short term, modest
improvements in the quality of care for two conditions:
asthma and diabetes.30 Once the targets were reached,
however, improvements in quality slowed. This theory
is supported by data froma survey of the level of attain-
ment of intervention indicators in England, which
showed that several quality indicators were rapidly
achieved by most practices in 2004-5, the year the
intervention was implemented.11 A similar high level
of attainment was reported in 2007-8.31 Our study sug-
gests that care for hypertension in theUnitedKingdom
was already close (or along the way) to reaching the
threshold required to achieve maximum payments
set in the pay for performance policy. The setting of
the indicator thresholds for maximum payment close
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to prevailing practice may have provided little incen-
tive for further improvement. Thus, pay for perfor-
mance may have simply supported existing practice
for hypertension.
In addition, pay for performance targeted a broad
range of 136 clinical performance indicators and doc-
tors may not have assigned the highest priority to the
five hypertension related measures. It is possible that
more attention may have been paid to more challen-
ging indicators. That said, almost 20% of the available
funds were directed at hypertension related perfor-
mance, so it is unlikely that more effort and attention
was paid to other performance measures.32 Imple-
menting the broad range of pay for performance tar-
gets in a series of stepsmay achieve greater attention to,
and improvement of, specific sets of quality measures.
Our study showed a lack of effect of pay for perfor-
mance on clinical outcomes (cumulative incidence
rates of myocardial infarction, stroke, heart failure,
and renal failure). A systematic review of several smal-
ler studies found similar results for doctors’ financial
incentives on patient level outcomes.1 The lack of
impact of the pay for performance initiative on these
long term adverse clinical outcomes is not surprising
given its failure to affect the more intermediate out-
come of blood pressure control, but at the least our
study suggests no overt harms associated with imple-
mentation of pay for performance for hypertension
related disease.
Strengths and limitations of the study
Our study has several limitations. Because the inter-
ventions were implemented in all four UK countries,
we had no suitable comparison group. We were there-
fore unable to follow similar populations in which
these interventions were not implemented. However,
we were able to obtain data on prescribing, healthcare
utilisation, and clinical outcomes for seven years,
including three years before the intervention. The use
of the strong quasi-experimental interrupted time ser-
ies design enabled us to control for pre-existing levels
and trends to detect any discontinuities in the out-
comes studied at the point pay for performance was
implemented. Adjusting for baseline trend in this way
helps to control for most threats to internal validity.24
Moreover, the large sample size, tight indicator trend
lines, and multiple types of outcome measures used in
this study provide compelling evidence for the lack of
effect of the pay for performance on hypertension care
and outcomes.
Given the unique nature of the UK National Health
Service, the generalisability of our results to other set-
tings is potentially limited. The NHS is a homogenous
single payer health system that provides coverage for
all UK residents. This is unlike the health systems in
many other industrialised countries. It is possible that
pay for performance interventions may have different
impacts in other types of healthcare systems.However,
evidence from other studies of doctor interventions to
improve quality suggests that doctors’ behaviour is not
necessarily different across health settings in industria-
lised countries. For example, two similar controlled
trials in the United Kingdom and the United States
failed to detect any impact of using computerised deci-
sion support to implement evidence based clinical
guidelines for the management of asthma and angina
in adults in primary care.33 34
Conclusion
In summary, our study has shown that explicit finan-
cial incentives did not improve the quality of care and
clinical outcomes for patients with hypertension in pri-
mary care in the United Kingdom. We found that the
quality of care for hypertension was improving and
already close to the threshold set for maximum pay-
ment in the pay for performance initiative. Some per-
formance thresholdsmay have been set too low for the
financial incentives to be effective.
In a setting such as the United Kingdom where sev-
eral measures of quality of care were already on the
path of continuous improvement, it seems that doctors
may be less responsive to performance based mone-
tary incentives to improve the care of hypertension
than most policy makers believe. Effective alternative
approaches to improving quality of primary care for
hypertension exist, such as case management or co-
management of hypertension and other chronic condi-
tionswith allied health professionals such as nurses and
pharmacists.35 Furthermore, evidence from studies of
educational interventions suggests that fewer, simpler
messages are more likely to achieve behaviour change
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than more complex, diffuse messages.36 Perhaps the
resources devoted to pay for performance for hyper-
tension would be better spent on implementing these
interventions more widely.
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WHAT IS ALREADY KNOWN ON THIS TOPIC
Systematic reviews have shown that the quality of care and intermediate outcomes of
patients with hypertension can be improved by educational outreach programmes, co-
management in mixed professional teams, and engaging patients in their own care
Evidence from sufficiently large well controlled studies to support or disprove pay for
performance as an effective tool to drive improvements in healthcare is scant, even for
common conditions such as hypertension
Some studies have reported small and short lived positive effects, whereas others have
suggested unintended harm
WHAT THIS STUDY ADDS
The large pay for performance initiative for primary care in the United Kingdom had no effect
on processes of care and outcomes for patients with hypertension
The quality of care and outcomes for these patients were already improving before pay for
performance was introduced; the initiative’s lack of effect may be explained in part by
performance targets that were set too close to existing practice
To stimulate further improvement in hypertension care in the United Kingdom, it may be
necessary to implement other evidence based interventions on a large scale
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